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Abstract In economic development nonprofits, the disparity between the non-
profit’s, its donor’s and the poor’s expectations concerning poverty alleviation has
been identified as the main reason for ineffective aid delivery. The study at hand
contributes to this discussion by following this question: How do the nonprofit, its
donors, the supported SMEs, and the poor refer to the nonprofit’s mission of poverty
alleviation when negotiating accountability? To answer this question, the study
follows the literature on accountability and resource dependency and presents
results of an empirical case study on multiple accountability relations between a
donor, a development aid nonprofit, its supported SMEs, and the poor living in the
environment of the supported SMEs. The results show a pattern we call ‘‘resource-
based accountability.’’ This pattern is constituted by the observation that most of the
stakeholders tried to meet the expectations of the resource owners with respect to
the resource owner’s understanding of successful poverty alleviation. Finally, the
paper introduces a hypothesis for further studies.
Re´sume´ Une des raisons principales du manque d’efficacite´ dans la livraison
d’aide des organisations a` but non lucratif dans le domaine du de´veloppement
e´conomique, semble provenir des divergences de conception entre organisations,
donateurs et pauvres en matie`re de re´duction de la pauvrete´. La pre´sente e´tude
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contribue a` cette discussion en posant la question suivante: comment les organi-
sations a` but non lucratif, leurs donateurs, les PME et les pauvres se re´fe`rent-ils a` la
mission de re´duction de la pauvrete´ lorsqu’il s’agit de ne´gocier les questions de
responsabilite´ ? Pour re´pondre a` cette question, notre e´tude suit la voie ouverte par
la litte´rature sur la responsabilite´ et la de´pendance des ressources et pre´sente les
re´sultats d’une e´tude de cas empirique des relations multiples ayant trait a` la re-
sponsabilite´ entre un donateur, une organisation a` but non lucratif dans le domaine
de l’aide au de´veloppement, les PME qu’elle soutient, et les pauvres qui vivent dans
la zone d’action des PME soutenues. Les re´sultats re´ve`lent un motif que nous
appelons la « responsabilite´ fonde´e sur les ressources » . Ce motif e´merge de cette
observation que la plupart des participants essayent de satisfaire les attentes de ceux
qui de´tiennent les ressources, suivant en cela la conception que les de´tenteurs de
ressources se font du succe`s en matie`re de re´duction de la pauvrete´. Pour finir,
l’article introduit des hypothe`ses qui pourront servir de base a` de futures e´tudes.
Zusammenfassung Bei Nonprofit-Organisationen fu¨r wirtschaftliche Entwick-
lung sind die unterschiedlichen Erwartungen der Nonprofit-Organisationen, ihrer
Spender und der Armen zum Abbau der Armut als ein Hauptgrund fu¨r eine une-
ffektive Hilfeleistung identifiziert worden. Die vorliegende Studie tra¨gt zu dieser
Diskussion bei und geht auf die folgende Frage ein: Wie sehen die Nonprofit-
Organisation, ihre Spender, die von ihr unterstu¨tzten kleinen und mittleren Unter-
nehmen und Arme die Mission der Nonprofit-Organisation zum Abbau der Armut,
wenn u¨ber Rechenschaftspflichten verhandelt wird? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage
lehnt sich die Studie an die Literatur zu den Themen Rechenschaftspflicht und
Ressourcenabha¨ngigkeit und pra¨sentiert die Ergebnisse einer empirischen Fallstudie
zu mehreren Rechenschaftsbeziehungen zwischen einem Spender, einer Nonprofit-
Organisation fu¨r Entwicklungshilfe, den von ihr unterstu¨tzten kleinen und mittleren
Unternehmen und den Armen, die im Wirkungskreis dieser unterstu¨tzten Unter-
nehmen leben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen ein Schema, das wir als ,,auf Ressourcen
basierende Rechenschaftspflicht‘‘bezeichnen. Dieses Schema begru¨ndet sich dad-
urch, dass bei einer Mehrheit der Stakeholder beobachtet wurde, wie sie versuchten,
den Erwartungen der Ressourceninhaber gema¨ß deren Versta¨ndnis eines erfolgrei-
chen Abbaus der Armut zu entsprechen. Abschließend wird in dem Beitrag eine
Hypothese fu¨r weitere Studien vorgestellt.
Resumen En las organizaciones de desarrollo econo´mico sin a´nimo de lucro
(EDNs, del ingle´s Economic development nonprofits), la disparidad entre las ex-
pectativas de las organizaciones sin a´nimo de lucro, de sus donantes y de los pobres
en relacio´n con el alivio de la pobreza ha sido identificada como una de las prin-
cipales razones para la entrega inefectiva de ayuda. El estudio en cuestio´n contri-
buye a este debate en base a la pregunta: >Co´mo las organizaciones sin a´nimo de
lucro, sus donantes las PYMES apoyadas y los pobres hacen referencia a la misio´n
de alivio de la pobreza por parte de las organizaciones sin a´nimo de lucro cuando se
negocia la responsabilidad? Para responder a esta pregunta, el estudio se basa en el
material publicado sobre responsabilidad y dependencia de recursos y presenta los
resultados de un estudio de caso empı´rico sobre mu´ltiples relaciones de
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responsabilidad entre un donante, una organizacio´n de ayuda al desarrollo sin a´nimo
de lucro, sus PYMES apoyadas y los pobres que viven en el entorno de las PYMES
apoyadas. Los resultados muestran un patro´n que denominamos ‘‘responsabilidad
basada en los recursos’’. Este patro´n esta´ constituido por la observacio´n de que la
mayorı´a de las partes interesadas trataron de satisfacer las expectativas del pro-
pietario de los recursos con respecto a la comprensio´n que e´ste tenı´a del alivio
satisfactorio de la pobreza. Finalmente, el presente documento introduce hipo´tesis
para estudios adicionales.
Keywords Nonprofit  Accountability  Development aid
In light of the UN summit on the millennium development goals (2010), much has
been written about a lack of effectiveness in development aid in achieving these
goals. A general debate over which strategies fight poverty most effectively has
unfolded (Banerjee and Duflo 2011) and, in particular, the question of whether
economic growth results in a reduction of poverty has seen lengthy discussions
(Deaton 2001; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Landingin 2007; Mehanna 2004; Ravallion
2001; Senauer 2002). Sachs for instance argues that bilateral aid remains ‘‘largely
unaccountable,’’ therefore inefficient (Sachs 2010). He appeals for multi-donor
approaches. In contrast, Easterly sees a major concern in aid as such and promotes
private business as the engine of ‘‘growth out of poverty’’ (Easterly 2010). In spite
of the strong positions of scholars like Sachs and Easterly, the role of aid programs
promoting trade for the alleviation of poverty remains unclear.
As aid delivery is a vast field (see Atack 1999 on diversity of development
nonprofits), this article concentrates on service organizations, ‘‘acting as interme-
diaries in providing services to […] entire populations’’ (Vakil 1997, p. 2063). It
aims at capturing how the service organizations’ promise of aid delivery is
perceived in the different accountability relations.
Among the category of development nonprofits, Economic Development
Nonprofits (EDNs) apply the ‘‘aid-for-trade’’ approach (Hayashikawa 2009). They
specialize in providing trade-promotion services to clients from developing
countries (Balser and McClusky 2005; Ospina et al. 2002). As a rule, their clients
are small and medium size enterprises or social entrepreneurs who benefit directly
from the nonprofit’s services (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Najam 1996). Despite
their clients, the EDN’s mission focuses on ‘‘the poor’’ as their main beneficiaries,
which expresses the belief that ‘‘economic growth is the most powerful tool to
reduce poverty’’ (Hayashikawa 2009, p. 13). This arises from the insight that
‘‘entrepreneurship is considered to be an important mechanism for economic
development through employment, innovation and welfare effects’’ (Naude´ 2010).
In short, EDNs (a) provide services to clients and (b) due to the services provided,
the clients are more economically sound and EDNs assume they have greater
economic potential to alleviate poverty in their area. However, existing studies
investigating the effectiveness of EDNs in reducing poverty question this
assumption (Autio 2008).
In recent years, more studies on a nonprofit’s accountability and mission
achievement have analyzed the context of development aid (Ebrahim 2001, 2003b;
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O’Dywer and Unerman 2007; Ve´ron et al. 2006). The high interest in accountability
of development nonprofits is a result of the sizeable funds provided to them by
governments and citizens to fight poverty (Edwards 2002; Lindenberg and Bryant
2001; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010) and the increasing questioning of their
performance (Fowler 1996, 2000; Lewis and Madon 2004; Malhotra 2000). EDNs
themselves find it difficult to show the results of their activities (Fowler 1996).
Hence, some researchers (Ebrahim 2003b, 2005; Kilby 2006; O’Dwyer and
Unerman 2010) have recently claimed that research on accountability for EDNs
should take priority.
The paper at hand seeks to contribute to the literature on accountability and
resource dependency of EDNs. First, it provides empirical insight from an
embedded comparative case study on three clients of a European EDN. Departing
from the idea that nonprofits act at the interface between donors and beneficiaries
(Agyeman et al. 2009), our research takes into account the challenges EDNs face in
handling multiple accountability relations (Najam 1996). Second, Brown and Moore
(2001) highlight that nonprofits promise different results to donors, clients, and
beneficiaries (Brown and Moore 2001, p. 572). These promises are negotiated with
different purposes. As proposed by the resource dependency theory in the
relationship with the donor, negotiations are dominated by the organization’s
interest in soliciting funds (Kreutzer 2009; Miller-Millesen 2003). The study on the
European EDN shows the link between the need to get resources and the
interpretation of the nonprofits’ mission. In the EDN’s relationship with clients,
service delivery is at the center, and in the relationship with beneficiaries, the
nonprofit’s social mission promise comes to the fore. In line with this observation,
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) and Porter (2003) identify disparity between donor
and beneficiary expectations concerning poverty alleviation as the main reason for
poor aid delivery. We intend to add to this literature by following this research
question: How do the EDN, its donors, the supported SMEs, and the poor refer to
the EDN’s mission of poverty alleviation when negotiating accountability?
We first analyze the state of the research on EDNs with respect to accountability
for effectiveness and resource dependency. Building on this, we present the case
setting, the method used for data collection and analysis, and subsequently disclose
our results. Finally, we elaborate on our findings, from which we will discuss
shortcomings and draw conclusions on theory, practice, and further research.
Accountability for Effectiveness and Resource Dependency in Development
Nonprofits
The discussion of accountability and its influence on aid effectiveness in
development nonprofits has not yet drawn many researchers’ attention. Among
the few studies that exist, Porter (2003) takes up the question of how the flow of
accountability information is organized in development work and what implications
it has for ‘‘design[ing] better targeted poverty alleviation programs’’ (Porter 2003,
p. 132). In her study, she analyzed the flow of ideas and information between the
nonprofit’s staff in developing countries and the staff in developed countries. She
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finds the information channels dominated by the headquarters in developed
countries and identifies a northern meta-language that hampers local ideas and
voices being heard (see also Townsend et al. 2002). According to Porter,
accountability practices emphasize quick results measured in quantitative terms
and lead nonprofit staff to avoid time-consuming evaluation to select the partners
and clients they team up with. She concludes that operational practices of
development NPOs tend to exclude listening and participation and hence do not
allow for downward accountability to clients and beneficiaries.
Similar to Porter, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2010) propose that effective aid
delivery would need to include listening to the priorities and needs at the beneficiary
and client level. However, their studies’ findings suggest many obstacles to
downward accountability. First, it is difficult for nonprofits in the developed world
to get access to the local communities in developing countries. The intermediaries
(local NGOs or clients) do not seem to be representative of the poor. Second,
nonprofits are reluctant to let the beneficiaries’ input guide strategic decision
making. Third, the scholars found a perception in western nonprofits that downward
accountability is not needed and that beneficiaries would not be interested in getting
involved. Unerman and O’Dwyer draw the conclusion that public funding agencies
need to demand strategic commitment of nonprofits to downward accountability. To
prevent the commitment from being rhetorical only, they claim that ‘‘more detailed
guidance’’ regarding the donor’s downward accountability requirements is needed.
Albeit these suggestions enhance the debate on downward accountability and
effectiveness, their study is still based on interviews with staff from nonprofits based
in developed countries. We still lack the perspective of beneficiaries in developing
countries on downward accountability.
Although the presented studies above express the need to engage beneficiaries in
accountability routines, there is not much insight into how such practices of
beneficiary involvement do or could work in practice. As a matter of fact, it seems
to be particularly difficult for nonprofits to engage with beneficiaries, and
researchers showed much evidence that upward accountability to donors dominates
nonprofits’ accountability efforts (Christensen and Ebrahim 2006; Edwards and
Hulme 1996; Kilby 2006; Young 2002). The reasons identified are twofold: On the
one hand, this dominance is rooted in the power relations between nonprofits and
their donors (Ebrahim 2002; Edwards and Hulme 1996). On the other hand, upward
accountability is structured by pre-defined tools characterized by a distinct and
tangible nature and is easy to replicate (Ebrahim 2003a). Donors demand clearly
structured annual reports and financial statements that often suffice to show
accountability. Downward accountability, in contrast, depends on ‘‘felt responsi-
bility’’ (Christensen and Ebrahim 2006: 207) toward beneficiaries, and its
mechanisms are less structured and rather broad, multifaceted processes to
implement than tools to apply (Howard-Grabman 2000; Kilby 2006).
EDN’s accountability to clients and beneficiaries in development work involves
another hurdle: Beneficiaries in developing countries are far away from the
headquarters in developed countries, leading nonprofit managers to formulate
project goals and outlines from their own institutional perspective (Hauge 2002).
Dialogs with the poor would involve considerable investment in the collection of
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qualitative data, which poses a resource problem to many EDNs (O’Dwyer and
Unerman 2010). Also, the governance structures of EDNs are not designed to
engage in detailed dialog with beneficiaries, which was perceived to overstretch the
organization (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010). What is more, beneficiaries’ and
clients’ evaluations of aid efficiency are highly context specific and based on
personal interpretation, making it hard to generalize (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001).
Because of beneficiaries’ and clients’ emphasis on qualitative interpretations,
nonprofit managers argue that beneficiaries may not recognize the long-term
consequences of aid programs and therefore would not provide valid interpretations
of the effectiveness of aid delivery.
In addition to this internal management reasoning to engage less with
beneficiaries and clients, Kilby (2006) and Lister (2000) link the lack of
implementation of downward accountability more directly to donors discouraging
downward accountability or remaining indifferent to it, hence influencing the
nonprofit not to invest in their relationship with the poor. In line with these research
results, some researchers such as Young (2002) have pointed out that upward
accountability hampers the mission focus of nonprofits. The donor’s accountability
demands seem to distract nonprofits from their mission, focusing them on
measurable facts that must not be in the mission’s focus.
The resource dependency theory introduces another observation for donors’
influence on nonprofits. This theory suggests that nonprofits will respond to and
become dependent on those organizations that control resources which are both
critical to its operations and over which it has limited control. Scholars observed
that the board of directors have to insure responsiveness to resource-based pressure,
e.g., to serve as ambassadors, advocates, and community representatives, and to link
the organization to critical constituent groups, to ultimately increase the flow of
critical resources (Kreutzer 2009; Miller-Millesen 2003). Funding structures affect
not only the role of boards but also the organization size, the number of board
members, the administrative complexity, the use of volunteers, and the racial
diversity of boards, staff, and volunteers (Stone and Hager 2001).
Accountability challenges in development aid are among the most complex in the
nonprofit sector (Ebrahim 2003b; Najam 1996). One reason for not achieving the
desired results in development cooperation seems to be ‘‘maladministration, caused
by a lack of accountability of aid agencies to the people whom they are supposed to
serve’’ (Sorens 2009, p. 88). Unerman and O’Dwyer (2010) claim that ‘‘account-
ability mechanisms can help improve the effectiveness of aid deployment’’
(Unerman and O’Dwyer 2010, p. 480). Yet, research on how such accountability
mechanisms in nonprofits are applied is still weak.
To conclude, the resource dependency theory provides the first explanations of a
nonprofit’s challenges in upward and downward accountability with regard to
phenomena like the board of directors, governance, and funding. However, the
resource dependency perspective has not yet been used to study EDNs, which is
partially also true for the accountability literature. Like Ospina et al. (2002) noticed
in 2002, there is a lack of empirical studies with respect to the dynamic of upward
and downward accountability in general and its relation to aid delivery and how
nonprofits are able to balance the different pulls of upward and downward in
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particular. As a consequence, we provide a comprehensive empirical study on
multiple accountabilities. We follow the call of Ospina et al. (2002, p. 27) for
‘‘empirically establishing the links between accountability and performance’’ by
analyzing how the EDN, its donors, the supported SMEs, and the beneficiaries argue
to support the EDN’s mission of poverty alleviation. We elucidate several
stakeholder perspectives and explore whether the EDN under study responds to
questions regarding mission achievement applying an either up- or downward-
dominated rhetoric.
Method
The Case
We have chosen the European economic development organization Eurodevelop (a
pseudonym, in the following EuDev) as our case. It has been subject to seven
evaluations of its impact within only 4 years. We therefore assume that the
organization was confronted with multiple accountability expectations during the
period of 2006–2009. The organization thus provides a powerful example of
nonprofit accountability (Siggelkow 2007) that helps us to understand the dynamics
present (Eisenhardt 1989). Furthermore, as researchers, we did not have the task of
evaluating the work of EuDev, but to develop a social impact assessment tool that
includes quantitative data and cases for EuDev.
EuDev is mainly financed by a European government agency. It implements
trade-promotion programs that help SMEs from developing and transition countries
to gain access to the European Market. It provides access to trade fairs and train the
SMEs in management issues. By strengthening the SMEs, EuDev facilitates the
creation of new jobs, thereby developing income sources for the poor. Correspond-
ingly, EuDev’s mission is to reduce poverty by supporting SMEs that have a
positive impact on the poor. EuDev acts as a service provider to the management of
the supported SMEs, thereby reaching out to the ultimate beneficiaries, the
supported company’s employees and their families. Thus, EuDev is embedded in
multiple accountability relations: upward to its funders and downward to SMEs
(clients) and the poor (beneficiaries). This enables us to look at the potentially
conflicting accountabilities to donors on the one hand and to SMEs and the poor on
the other hand, a situation that leaves the staff to cope with the different
accountability pulls.
Data Gathering
In order to shed light on the multiple accountabilities in which EuDev operates, in-
depth narrative interviews were our main means of data collection. In all interviews,
we focused on the interview partner’s past experiences with all stakeholders
involved. We asked for examples of how the other stakeholders impacted the
interview partner’s decision making with respect to support (in the case of the public
agency, the nonprofit, and the SME) or with respect to their daily lives (in the case
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of the poor). We were also interested in how the interview partner was involved in
the relationships with other stakeholders. In all interviews, we refrained from using
the expression ‘‘poverty reduction.’’ Instead, we asked how the stakeholders
recognized that the partnership was a success. We used the broad term of success as
a construct to reveal accountability references to the mission of poverty alleviation.
We left it up to the interview partner when and how he or she used the expression
‘‘poverty reduction.’’
We collected data on five levels: First, we conducted in-depth narrative
interviews with EuDev’s staff members as well as the executive director. In
addition, we collected documents that were related to their accountability efforts
(annual reports and evaluations). Second, we interviewed project managers at the
government agency, EuDev’s donor, who are involved with EuDev. At the donor
level, we collected success stories delivered by EuDev as well as memoranda of
understanding for specific projects. Third, in our capacity as observers in a strategy
meeting in which staff from EuDev and the government agency discussed criteria
for measuring impact on poverty alleviation, we were able to examine the
relationship more closely. In addition, we conducted post-focus groups after the
initial interviews with both EuDev and the donor, reflecting on the interview
analysis.
After having gathered data on EuDev’s context in the developed country, we
chose to look at three projects the organization supports in developing countries. In
doing so, we follow Yin in using embedded cases (Yin 1998). The three embedded
cases were selected by EuDev and the research team according to four criteria: (1)
the SME had to be active in a poverty context, (2) had to be embedded in an
international supply chain, (3) had to be led by a top management team with at least
40 employees, and (4) had to be supported by EuDev in its 3-year program.
Applying these criteria, we chose to visit three SMEs, two coffee cooperatives in
Table 1 Embedded cases
Embedded in poverty context
(as judged by EuDev)
Supply
chain
Management and
employees
Supported
by EuDev
Coffee cooperative Pamar
Yes International 2 top managers 3-year program
15 employees
90 members
Coffee cooperative Flora
Yes International 5 top manager 3-year program
30 employees
200 members
Welding company Rava
Yes International 3 top managers 3-year program
60 employees
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Peru and a welding company in Macedonia, that had a maximum of commonalities,
being aware that—due to the research field of international development cooper-
ation—the cases will naturally differ in cultural and institutional contexts (Table 1).
Having chosen our embedded cases, as a fourth level, we analyzed EuDev’s
relationship to its clients, the SMEs in developing countries. Data were collected in
summer 2009 (Peru) and October 2009 (Macedonia) through 26 narrative interviews
and three focus groups in Peru and 13 narrative interviews in Macedonia with the
management of the supported companies and people knowledgeable about the local
Peruvian and Macedonian contexts. Finally, as a fifth layer of our analysis, we
interviewed EuDev’s beneficiaries, the workers and families of the SMEs that we
visited. In Peru, we interviewed 21 beneficiaries, in Macedonia 25. All interviews
were fully transcribed and observations documented by copious field notes. Table 2
shows all levels of data collection.
Data Analysis
For the analysis of our data, we followed a content analysis process (Neuendorf
2002) combined with invivo coding (Strauss 1987) in order to illuminate how
nonprofit staff, donor, clients, and beneficiaries referred to the mission of poverty
alleviation in accountability negotiations.
In order to create a codebook for our data analysis, two researchers separately
read through the interview transcripts and field notes. To capture accountability
negotiations, we identified arguments nonprofit managers, donor agency members,
SME managers, and workers and families used when assessing the perceived
effectiveness of the partnership (Morrison and Salipante 2007). Within these
arguments, we sought to identify references to poverty alleviation. Initially, the
most obvious references were derived from EuDev’s mission statement: ‘‘support
developing and transition countries in their endeavors to reduce poverty’’ and
‘‘supporting sustainable growth of small and medium sized enterprises.’’ Using the
two codes ‘‘reduce poverty’’ and ‘‘sustainable growth of SME’’ as our starting point,
we developed a more subtle grid of invivo codes for all five levels of data collected:
In the interview transcripts and field notes, we tracked the way the different actors
interpreted the two categories ‘‘reduce poverty’’ and ‘‘sustainable growth of SME.’’
The text passages we identified as containing an interpretation of effectiveness
relating to either ‘‘reduce poverty’’ or ‘‘sustainable growth of SME’’ were
paraphrased into invivo codes.
To reach high intercoder reliability (Neuendorf 2002), the two researchers
compared each others’ experiences in interpreting three randomly chosen
interviews. They checked their own results (which text passages were identified
and how they were paraphrased) against the results of the other, discussing potential
ambiguities. Only when a common understanding was reached did the two
researchers continue to code the rest of the texts. Table 3 gives an overview of the
coding process and the resulting invivo codes.
In order to capture the multiple accountabilities, we also sought to identify which
actor in the accountability line was addressed when an argument containing a
reference to poverty alleviation was put forward. Grouping the paraphrases by
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Table 2 Data set
Focus of analysis Step Research activity No. of
texts
NPO 1 Pre-focus group
First insights into EuDev’s accountability challenges
Data collection (texts produced during the workshops) 2
Identifying interview partners
2 Interviews with project managers and CEO
Two researchers 9
Narrative, in-depth interview style
3 Collection of documents
Annual reports from 1998 to 2008 20
Evaluation reports 7
4 Post-focus groups (mirroring the interview analysis) 1
Donor 1 Interviews with donor’s project managers
Two researchers
Narrative, in-depth interview style 7
2 Collection of documents
Memorandum of understanding
Success stories delivered by EuDev 13
NPO donor 1 Observation of strategy meeting between EuDev and donor 1
2 Post-focus groups on relationship and case studies 7
NPO clients (SMEs) 1 Interviews with local EuDev representative in developing
country
Peru case A & B: 2 people
Macedonia case: 1 person 3
2 Interviews with knowledgeable of the local context concerning
poverty alleviation impacts
Peru case A & B: 7 people
Macedonia case: 8 people 15
3 Interviews with management of companies
Peru case A: 7 people 20
Peru case B: 10 people
Macedonia: 3 people
4 Focus groups (mirroring the interview analysis and data
collection)
3
Peru: 2 focus groups
Macedonia: 1 focus group
NPO beneficiaries
(worker, family)
1 Interviews with workers and families of companies
Peru case A: 12 people
Peru case B: 9 people 46
Macedonia: 25 people
Sum interviews 100
Sum focus groups 14
Sum documents 40
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Table 3 Coding process
Level Unit of analysis Coding process Codes
Starting
point
EuDev’s social mission Deriving references from
mission statement
Reduce poverty
Supporting sustainable growth
of small and medium-sized
enterprises
Level 1 Negotiation of impact
on poverty
alleviation within
EuDev
Breaking down phrases ‘‘reduce
poverty’’ and ‘‘sustainable
growth of SME’’ following the
interpretation of these abstract
categories by interviewees
‘‘Reduce poverty’’
Better living conditions of the
SME managers and workers
Aim at long value chains in
the country
More jobs, reducing
unemployment
When we leave the country,
self-sustaining structures
need to be there
‘‘Sustainable growth of SMEs’’
SMEs can independently
continue their exporting
Improvement of working
conditions
More exports, growing volume
of sales
Not support companies who
are already able to export on
their own
Level 2 Negotiation of
EuDev’s impact on
poverty alleviation
within donor agency
Breaking down phrases ‘‘reduce
poverty’’ and ‘‘sustainable
growth of SME’’ following the
interpretation of these abstract
categories by interviewees
‘‘Reduce poverty’’
Macroeconomic influence on
poverty alleviation
Accelerate exports and reach
prosperity
Identify the bottleneck for
economic development,
create more income
‘‘Sustainable growth of SMEs’’
More companies at fairs in
Europe
Entrepreneurship creates
solutions for society
Creating business-friendly
environments
Institutional sustainability
Level 3 Interaction of EuDev
and donor agency
See level one and two See level one and two
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taking into account who was addressed, we illuminate characteristics of arguments
referring to poverty alleviation and examine routines people draw upon to relay
information. From the analysis, five argumentation strategies that refer to poverty
alleviation emerge.
Table 3 continued
Level Unit of analysis Coding process Codes
Level 4 Negotiation of
EuDev’s contribution
to SME at client’s
level
Breaking down the nonprofits’
and donors’ interpretations of
‘‘reduce poverty’’ and
‘‘sustainable growth of SME’’
category, following the
success criteria at SME
manager level
‘‘Reduce poverty’’
More income
Living conditions of managers
improved: building houses,
buying cars and motorcycles
Employing jobless and from
black market
Establishing infrastructure for
workers: access to health
care and insurance,
providing changing rooms,
showers, and toilets
‘‘Sustainable growth of SMEs’’
Improved reputation of the
company
Jobs created (company,
supplier)
Ability to export, growth of
sales volume
Better infrastructure
(buildings, machines)
Level 5 Negotiation of SME’s
impact on poverty
alleviation at
beneficiaries’ level
Breaking down the SME
managers’ interpretations of
‘‘reduce poverty’’ and
‘‘sustainable growth of SME’’
category, following the
success criteria at workers and
family level
‘‘Reduce poverty’’
Social support/stability: access
to credits, transparency in
companies’ decision making,
community building
Personal freedom
Change of living conditions:
Regular salary, better income
Personal development:
education, possibility for
training
‘‘Sustainable growth of SMEs’’
Pride: working for
respected company
Motivation to serve
international clients
Voluntas (2014) 25:772–796 783
123
Results of the Case: References to Poverty Alleviation
Argumentation of Employees Working for the Donor Agency
To illustrate the poverty-reducing impact of trade promotion for SMEs, the head of
the specific donor department tells the following story: ‘‘In the north of
Mozambique, out of 50,000 people only seven were officially employed until a
local business man decided to invest. He bought an old cashew nuts production site
and started to grow cashew nuts again. He created 300 direct jobs and 5,000 families
act as suppliers. Due to the support we offered he now exports high quality cashew
products. This is a very clear contribution to poverty reduction. In the town small
grocery stores opened, teachers came back and an airfield was constructed. You
need leading small businesses to support such regional development.’’ His story
captures all aspects of EuDev’s mission statement and strongly connects poverty
alleviation with sustainable growth of small and medium-sized enterprises. Hence,
when addressing expectations regarding aid delivery by EuDev, the donor
emphasizes effects on companies and countries: ‘‘We are happy if EuDev has
good results on a project level. This would mean that we have more companies from
developing countries at fairs in Europe,’’ a project manager explains. Another notes,
‘‘We are happy with macroeconomic effects on poverty alleviation. Supporting a
company has an impact on the development of the country.’’ In the same vein, the
donor assumes that EuDev has had an impact as he asserts, ‘‘We have to ask what
would happen if the companies supported by EuDev had no access to the European
Market?’’
When the donor agencies’ project managers discuss among themselves if it is
worthwhile to support EuDev, they reflect on its position in their chain of aid
programs: ‘‘EuDev is only the peak of the iceberg. They work with the best
companies in transition countries,’’ a project manager explains. In terms of impact
on development, project managers ask a crucial question: ‘‘Is there a bottleneck that
influences export potential much earlier in the value chain that EuDev does not
address?’’ EuDev thus has to answer to the expectation that it will generate a
maximum impact: ‘‘They need to show to taxpayers and us what they do with the
money they receive. Could they have more impact with the same funds?’’
Since the donor agencies’ own impact depends on the impact of the programs
they finance, project managers at the donor agency reflect on their contribution to
poverty alleviation as well. For them, the poor are an abstract category related to
when discussing statistics. ‘‘Statistics show that the poor work in the agricultural
sector. If we help them introduce bio-certification, they will get 60 % more for their
product when they export,’’ a project manager states, explaining his approach.
Another adds, ‘‘We have indexes of poverty. All this is very complex and very
exciting.’’
To conclude, the donor focuses on macroeconomic effects on poverty alleviation
by reasoning that business is good for development. They have an interest in EuDev
accounting for effectiveness because EuDev’s performance will influence their own
legitimacy.
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Argumentation of Nonprofit’s Members
The SMEs supported by EuDev are those most often addressed by the nonprofit
managers when discussing their mission-related success. For these SMEs, they
create better working conditions and a better business environment. ‘‘It is great fun
to see a company produce in a modern production site after being supported by us,’’
a project manager explains. Also, through the company’s success, jobs are created:
‘‘We have a company that started with eight people. Now they have 55 employees.’’
References are made to better working conditions: ‘‘The company was able to set up
a proper workspace with clean facilities and changing rooms for men and women,’’
a nonprofit manager asserts. Telling these personal success stories is important for
EuDev managers: ‘‘If a company has success, I can see this with my own eyes.’’
However, the workers and families of these companies are not mentioned in their
accounts. Stories of successful projects mostly involve arguments such as growing
exports, the number of jobs created, and the learning process of the company,
without referring to the implications this has in terms of poverty alleviation: ‘‘A
successful project is one that has an impact on the company. The project has no
other goal than enhancing exports, creating jobs and finding partnerships for the
companies we support,’’ a project manager concludes. Therefore, when presenting
EuDev to the companies in developing countries, project managers emphasize
‘‘things that are of interest for these people, how we help develop the company, their
export strategy. The overall goal of poverty alleviation is presented but does not
play a big role.’’ Hence, most references to the nonprofits’ social mission concern
sustainable growth of SMEs.
Explicit references to reducing poverty are much more abstract than the success
stories told in reference to the SMEs. A project manager of EuDev explains, ‘‘We
contribute to the alleviation of poverty by helping to accelerate the sales and
creating jobs.’’ The link between economic growth and poverty reduction is
described as a belief: ‘‘If we economically believe that export promotion will
enhance prosperity in a country, I think this will also lead to poverty reduction.’’
EuDev managers have no personalized success stories to tell when it comes to
poverty alleviation. Instead, they address an abstract group, ‘‘the poor.’’ ‘‘Poor
people are always part of the game because they supply the elements that are
important to arrive at the export product. We must aim at long value chains in the
country,’’ asserts a project manager. Thus, the dominant line of argument used by
EuDev managers comes to the fore: ‘‘To reach the ultimate goal of poverty
alleviation the market dictates the projects. I can have the best product but if there is
no demand in Europe, I cannot sell it and hence cannot reach the goal,’’ a EuDev
manager states as he summarizes the logic.
With respect to its donor, EuDev shows selective success stories on company
growth. A project manager says, ‘‘For our donor it is fine if we can say: 300 more
jobs, 27 million sales volume generated.’’ EuDev’s strategy with regard to the donor
is to satisfy its expectations: ‘‘We do our work in a way that is appreciated by
them,’’ asserts a project manager. EuDev’s CEO interprets the nonprofit’s work as
serving as a PR tool for the donor: ‘‘If we are successful, our donor can gain higher
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visibility through us. It is a nice PR tool,’’ she says. Talking about poverty
alleviation is seen by project managers as ‘‘donor language,’’ the CEO explains.
The same reasoning is used when EuDev addresses taxpayers in its accountability
efforts: ‘‘The message of poverty alleviation needs to address the taxpayers, not the
SMEs in developing countries,’’ a project manager concludes. Addressing the
taxpayers, EuDev interprets its mission as a political mandate: ‘‘Our political
mandate requires legitimating how we spend the money,’’ the CEO asserts.
To conclude, EuDev’s reasoning when referring to poverty alleviation can be
summarized according to the following pattern: better conditions for doing business,
exporting, more jobs and prosperity in the country, and hence poverty alleviation as
an abstract goal. Poverty alleviation is used to rhetorically legitimize the nonprofit’s
activities to donors. But, the references to poverty rest on abstract terms and success
stories since the immediate clients rarely have anything to do with poverty: ‘‘The
companies we work with are all out of poverty already. But in some sectors we
reach the poor better than in others,’’ the CEO states, summarizing EuDev’s
reasoning. She explains the difficulty of accounting for impact: ‘‘At the moment we
have concrete goals regarding SME-support, but we do not know what we will
achieve as a consequence of these goals. Achieving results does not necessarily
mean that we have an impact on poverty alleviation.’’
Argumentation of SME’s Members and the ‘‘Poor’’
Pamar
When talking about the most tangible benefit of EuDev, a manager of the
cooperative Pamar explains: ‘‘We can pay more to our members.’’ Also, because of
external visibility, the reputation of the cooperation increased: ‘‘We have visitors
who want to learn about the process of our cooperative. Pamar is a role model for
organizational setups,’’ a manager asserts. Good management practices that others
want to learn about are put forward by managers of Pamar as a reason for their
success: ‘‘Pamar is much more transparent than other cooperatives. We give
technical support to our producers, which makes us different from others.’’ In
discussing good management practices, poverty alleviation is not referred to
explicitly. Rather, issues of their transparency and democratic decision making lead
to a good working climate. The importance of transparency in decision making also
comes up in negotiations with EuDev. Managers of Pamar argue that EuDev ‘‘gives
with open hands (to many different enterprises).’’ They conclude, ‘‘Criteria should
be developed for deserving their support (for poverty alleviation). There should be a
complete analysis of the organization EuDev supports.’’
Besides showing good management practices, which represent an argument
addressing EuDev managers, improvements for the communities in which the
producers are embedded are a priority for managers at Pamar. One of them explains,
‘‘We develop a better quality of life. We work for the infrastructure of the
cooperative.’’ It is important to the managers to live in the same area as the
producers: ‘‘We want people to invest in community building. Many other
cooperatives have their office in the main town, but we are with our members.’’
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They thus know the needs of the local people: ‘‘The request to build the hospital
came from our members; the local municipality was not strong enough to build the
hospital, so we stepped in,’’ a manager stated, explaining the cooperative’s success
in developing better living conditions for its workers. Analyzing the needs of the
producer families, the management of Pamar acts. ‘‘The level of education is low so
we built a school,’’ one of them says.
At the level of the beneficiaries, the impact of the cooperative is referred to as
building a community of people who work and live together, at the same time
paying attention to the environment and good living conditions. The producers note
that ‘‘European consumers know how to value the product if they see how we live
and produce coffee in the region.’’ Being part of a cooperative that is supported and
hence has the opportunity to export improved the living conditions of the families.
‘‘This year we received a better price. I want to increase my family’s quality of life.
I will buy a motorcycle because the distance from my house to the production area
is far. I will invest in a new sort of plantation,’’ a producer explains. In addition to
higher prices, the producers value the social support by Pamar: ‘‘In the cooperative I
can get credits. If I manage my budget well, I can have enough for the family and
for paying back the credit.’’ Furthermore, education is seen as having an impact as
well: ‘‘Pamar changed my lifestyle: we consume products from the region and learn
not to destroy the environment and learn how to use local products,’’ a producer
asserts. Thus, members of the cooperative are empowered to discuss what they can
change themselves in order to make a better living.
In conclusion, when discussing the impact of the cooperative, EuDev is referred
to as the partner who made many improvements possible. However, in respect to
EuDev, the predominant references are customers, market access, and visibility,
hence the criteria expected by EuDev. Independent from EuDev, the management’s
dominant argumentation pattern is different: Good management practices are linked
to caring about the community, resulting in a better quality of life. Poverty
alleviation is discussed as better living conditions for cooperative members. This
has an impact. Beneficiaries at Pamar value that the quality of life has improved due
to their membership in Pamar and its management caring for the community.
Flora
For managers of Flora, it is important to show that the cooperative already has a
long successful history: ‘‘We are the only cooperative that has survived since 1966,’’
a manager of Flora proudly notes. ‘‘Since 1995, 80 % of what we have received as
extra price for fair trade was invested in agricultural training and a production
plant,’’ they state, indicating their investment strategy. This development has taken
place without EuDev supporting them. Hence, in contrast to the case of Pamar, the
management of Flora does not mention that exporting and generating more were
possible due to EuDev’s support. Instead, they relate to EuDev as one of several
European donors who require reports on transparency, impact, and educational
projects. Poverty reduction is referred to fulfill the donors’ demands: ‘‘International
donors support us because we do the follow-up reports according to their
specifications. We reach the indicators. The cooperative presents new educational
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projects every 4 years; every year we present our results—the donors expect good
communication and reports,’’ a manager of Flora notes, explaining the reporting
routine that relates to effectiveness of aid delivery.
As a consequence, the predominant arguments raised when discussing success at
Flora relate to education and training for producers as well as the opportunity to
receive microcredits: ‘‘The producers need credits to survive in the months when
they cannot sell coffee; if members have health problems, they can receive credit.
The decision on whether to grant the credit is made by the general assembly,’’ are
some of the statements that the management uses to explain how they improve
producers’ living conditions.
The producers paint another picture of Flora: ‘‘The cooperative has a good
reputation - but the living conditions of the members are very bad,’’ a producer
explains. Another notes, ‘‘The management’s image is okay but the relationship
with their members is not. Socially we have been abandoned.’’ A big issue in the
cooperative is considered to be the replacement of the general assembly with a
council of representatives. ‘‘This is a strong change, because we do not know
anymore what has been decided. They do not tell us anymore how much is exported
and how much they get per kilo coffee,’’ a producer reports. Furthermore, ‘‘people
from the cooperative’s administration took money for themselves. But members
who complain are kicked out,’’ the situation is described. In line with these negative
impacts, producers claim that the cooperative is manipulating the audits when
referring to how the cooperative shows impact on poverty alleviation to donors:
‘‘When (…) auditors come, the management sends them to farmers who are
prepared to give good answers,’’ a producer explains (This also happened to the
researchers. They overcame the manipulation by selecting interviewed producers
independently from the cooperative management).
Despite these accounts, producers explain that they profit from better prices since
they sell their coffee as bio- and fair trade-certified product. This allows them to
develop a midterm plantation strategy. Also, producers ‘‘recognize that the
management has supported us with road maintenance during harvest time. If it
rains and we had no support from the cooperative for drying our coffee we would
loose a big amount of our production,’’ they state, acknowledging the help of the
cooperative’s management.
In conclusion, Flora’s managers refer to improved living conditions of the
producers who live in impoverished conditions. With regard to EuDev as their
donor, they present social projects to highlight why they deserve to be supported.
When talking about the impact of the cooperative on poverty alleviation,
beneficiaries at Flora complain that they do not participate in Flora’s economic
success. EuDev is referred to as the agency that is manipulated by the cooperative.
Rava
In Rava, the partnership with EuDev is perceived as purely economic assistance.
‘‘EuDev supports us only because they think we can be successful. Our readiness for
export is the essential part for them,’’ the CEO of the company explains. EuDev was
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presented to them with regard to what the partnership could do for the company’s
development.
The company’s culture and its abilities are the predominant topics that the
management relates to when talking about how—with EuDev—they became even
more successful: ‘‘We are a serious company with good quality and forward
thinking. There are not many companies thinking like we do,’’ the CEO of Rava
notes as he illustrates the qualities of his company in the context of Macedonia. He
explains that his company would have been mature enough to independently sell
internationally: ‘‘It would have been possible to export on our own, but it is better if
someone supports you with money,’’ he asserts. Growing fast in the past few years,
the company was able to create jobs: ‘‘People in the municipality come to us and ask
us for jobs. Relatives and neighbors of workers also come and ask. We make a
database with these contacts and we contact them when we need them,’’ a manager
says in explanation of the recruiting policy. At Rava, managers are proud of good
working conditions: ‘‘We have a positive company culture and good relations to our
workers.’’
When workers at Rava talk about improvements in their quality of life, they refer
to more stability due to regularly paid and higher salaries than they would receive in
other companies. ‘‘For me Rava is one of the best companies in Macedonia. Many
others do not pay a regular salary,’’ a worker says. A wife of a worker adds, ‘‘In my
husband’s former job in a big company he was not paid regularly. We are feeling
safer now that we know that the salary comes every month.’’ The workers describe
the company as a responsible and caring institution. Good management practices
such as paid overtime, freedom of speech, and recognition of workers’ achieve-
ments are highly valued. Workers explain that managers at Rava help them achieve
higher standards of living: ‘‘When I started to build my own house, I asked the
owner of Rava if he could help me with a loan. I received all the money that I
needed and I was already able to pay him back,’’ a worker says. In that sense, life
becoming more comfortable is a topic among workers. The sustainable growth of
Rava in combination with good management practices is mentioned as the means to
achieving a better living standard. EuDev’s support did not make a difference in the
eyes of the workers.
In conclusion, Rava’s main point of reference when arguing their impact on
poverty alleviation is the company. Because the relationship to EuDev has been
built on economic matters, poverty reduction is never referred to. However, the
creation of jobs and training are used to exemplify the company’s contribution to
society.
Accountability Patterns: Following the Resource
The case shows that apart from the poor, all stakeholders were in the role of the
resource owner: the donor, the nonprofit, and the SMEs. All stakeholders but the
donor tried to meet the expectations of the resource owners with respect to the
resource owner’s understanding of successful poverty alleviation. Their goal was to
gain the resource. It was less to inform about their impacts on poverty alleviation.
This conclusion is rooted in three observations: First, in the relation between EuDev
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and its donor, EuDev emphasizes the importance of achieving growth of SMEs,
using links to poverty alleviation as rhetorical vocabulary that reflects ‘‘donor
language.’’ With respect to the poor, both the donor and EuDev use an abstract
description by talking about ‘‘poor countries’’ or ‘‘the poor’’ without clear
explanations. EuDev’s donor is only asking EuDev to prove its impact by the
quantity of supported SMEs and does not hold EuDev accountable for measurable
impact on poverty.
Second, managers at EuDev demand from SMEs the numbers and stories that
show their support helped the SMEs to grow and export. EuDev is not holding the
SMEs accountable for measurable impact on poverty. The poor are only mentioned
in arguments concluding that the poor will benefit from the business support through
the creation of jobs and prosperity in the country. The SMEs’ accountability
arguments mainly refer to gaining access to EuDev and its support by reporting the
information expected by EuDev. When the SMEs account for support received from
EuDev, they generally report on growth indicators.
Third, meeting EuDev’s reporting expectation as a reason for references to
poverty alleviation is represented in an extreme form in the case of Flora. With
Flora, EuDev supports a company that uses references to poverty alleviation solely
to acquire EuDev’s support. In that case, the poor are exploited. The poor members
of the cooperative report that the cooperative was abandoned by the management in
order to be able to better influence selected producers for their own purposes. Since
the management of Flora recognized the pressure weighing on EuDev to report
success on mission achievement, they delivered the necessary data by organizing
meetings between EuDev’s managers or external evaluating staff and briefed
producers. EuDev benefits from Flora’s strategy by having reports of an
economically and apparently socially successful company in its project portfolio.
Since beneficiaries can exercise no voice with regard to EuDev, they are used as a
‘‘social success story.’’ Listening to beneficiaries would have revealed the repressive
practices implemented by the management in order to arrive at the social success
cases. We assume that because of Flora’s well-developed reports, neither EuDev nor
other involved nonprofits critically examined these reports.
Besides the ‘‘resource supply strategy,’’ we observed another pattern of gaining
poverty alleviation success stories: In the case of Rava, EuDev supports an already
established business. The choice of Rava reflects EuDev’s need to find SMEs to be
able to report on the donor’s key performance indicators (KPI) like number of
supported businesses and growth in employees of these businesses, which from the
donor’s point of view are indicators for success with regard to poverty alleviation.
In that sense, the donor does not directly discourage the implementation of
downward accountability (Kilby 2006; Lister 2000), but at the same time the KPI
set by the donor strongly directs the nonprofits’ focus away from the beneficiaries
and toward the partnering resources of clients. In conclusion, we can only assume
that a lack of questions regarding the impact on poverty alleviation from the donor
results in no effort to invest in the relationship with the beneficiaries. The practice of
selecting SMEs is then led by the market-oriented KPIs. This leads to EuDev
strengthening the economic success argument in negotiations with SMEs. SMEs
who are included in the program are only provided with information regarding the
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service and product transaction, necessarily excluding the goal to alleviate poverty.
Since poverty alleviation is not mentioned as a goal of the cooperation between
EuDev and Rava, accountability negotiations do not reveal that Rava is not
embedded in a poverty environment.
That the support of Pamar shows direct poverty alleviation impact seems to be
more a coincidence than a result of EuDev’s planned action. Pamar’s managers and
members reflected on their impact on the local community and on poverty
alleviation. Because they see EuDev investing in other companies, which they
consider do not support poverty alleviation, they call for social accounting
standards. They seek more transparency in EuDev’s selection of companies that
really contribute to local poverty alleviation.
In sum, as an overall pattern, most stakeholders, the donor, EuDev, the SMEs—
despite Pamar—and the poor act in a way to gain resources. As presented in the
preceding observations, accountability is less about reporting local impact on
poverty alleviation, but about reporting to meet the expectations of the one who
decides on giving or not giving resources. Capturing the multiple accountability
relations in Fig. 1 helps visualizing the flow of information relevant to satisfy
multiple accountabilities (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001).
Theoretical Contribution: Resource-Based Accountability Versus Impact-Based
Accountability
We reconstructed one overall observable type of reference to the nonprofit’s mission
within accountability negotiations: we call this type ‘‘resource-based accountabil-
ity.’’ Resource-based accountability extends the resource dependency theory and
specifies upward accountability in two ways: First, it focuses on gaining resources,
not on upward stakeholders and their expectations in general like studied in the
Fig. 1 Multiple accountability dynamic in EuDev
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literature (Christensen and Ebrahim 2006; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Kilby 2006;
Young 2002). Second, in resource-based accountability, upward accountability
dominates downward accountability, which prohibits effectiveness of aid delivery
based on the beneficiaries’ expectation. This is in line with previous studies on
nonprofits’ resource dependency. Our study extends those studies as their main
focus lies on governance and organizational aspects in those nonprofits (Kreutzer
2009; Miller-Millesen 2003; Stone and Hager 2001). We integrate the perspective of
the key stakeholders and stakeholders of stakeholders. In ‘‘resource-based
accountability’’ resource dependency is not only true for EDNs but also for all
other actors involved, namely SMEs and the poor.
With the following six hypothesis, we describe resource-based accountability in
more detail and differentiate it from impact-based accountability (Fig. 2).
Our results confirm that development nonprofit staff is reluctant to include local
knowledge in the decision-making process (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010), but we
cannot conclude that access to local communities is the main reason that prohibits
local knowledge to be included. Our observation summarized by the expression
‘‘resource-based accountability’’ uncovers that the commitment linked to the results
promised to donors and beneficiaries differs. Confirming Brown and Moore (2001),
the social mission promise is related to the beneficiaries. This promise, however, is
made without committing to it in negotiations with beneficiaries and clients. We
therefore confirm Ebrahim’s (2003) conclusion that downward accountability is
based on felt responsibility—which in our case did not play a major role. As the
main reason for downward accountability being neglected, O’Dwyer and Uner-
man’s (2010) research results suggest that nonprofits find it difficult to get access to
the local communities. In our study, we cannot confirm this difficulty as a reason for
inhibited downward accountability. The intermediaries between EuDev and the
poor, the SMEs, work closely with the poor and, in the case of Pamar and Rava,
have very good relations with the local communities. Instead, our observations
suggest that donors simply do not demand for more concrete information and follow
Fig. 2 Resource-based accountability vs. impact-based accountability
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the assumption that what is good for the SME is good for the poor. This leads to the
first hypothesis:
H1a The less donors demand for concrete information about the beneficiaries, the
stronger EDNs meet the donor’s expectation on poverty alleviation.
H1b The stronger EDNs meet the donor’s expectation on poverty alleviation, the
stronger clients (supported SMEs) meet the need of EDNs for information on
poverty alleviation to be accountable toward donors.
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) suggest that the lack of the donor’s demand for
concrete information about the beneficiaries is driven by the fact that dialogs with
beneficiaries are too resource intensive. Our own research process shows that
gathering data at the beneficiary level is time consuming. However, less in-depth
interviews and some standardized questionnaires could be a solution to the problem,
which has not been considered by the nonprofit under study. We therefore support
Kilby (2006) in his conclusion that exercising downward accountability is largely a
matter of the nonprofit’s worldview. In the nonprofit we looked at, KPI-based
measuring of results that satisfy the donor is more important than listening to the
poor and enhances a tendency toward measuring quick results [see also Porter
(2003), Kilby (2006), Lister (2000) and Young (2002)]. Because satisfying
accountability expectations is tailored to gaining resources, like the resource
dependency theory proposes (Miller-Millesen 2003), those who provide the decisive
resources (donors) are listened to, whereas expectations of holders of intangible
resources (clients and beneficiaries) are less important. Hence, our research results
also support Ebrahim’s (2003a) suggestion that criteria in upward accountability are
more tangible and therefore easy to report. This confirms Porter’s (2003) conclusion
that NPOs’ operational practices exclude listening to beneficiaries. The problem
seems to be that without the pressure from donors linking their support to
beneficiary inclusion, the additional effort in collecting qualitative data and being
able to interpret the beneficiaries’ accounts is not attractive to nonprofits (Howard-
Grabman 2000; Lindenberg and Bryant 2001) (see also O’Dwyer and Unerman
(2010) demand of criteria to report on beneficiaries).
H2a The more money EDNs receive from foreign donors not familiar with the
beneficiaries, the more they try to meet donor’s expectations without gathering data
at the beneficiary’s level.
H2b The more EDNs try to meet donor’s expectations, the less effective their aid
delivery.
Looking at the accounts of the poor, our results differ from Ospina et al.’s (2002)
observations. In their study, Ospina and her colleagues focused on Identity-Based
Non-Profits (IBNP), which are rooted in and organized for their communities,
defined in reference to the shared identity of community members. The strong social
embeddedness of Identity-Based Non-Profits with its local communities character-
izes their relationship to their accountability environment. Nonprofits strongly
embedded with the communities of their beneficiaries are challenged by a pull of
those communities for multiple accountability negotiation (Ospina et al. 2002). In
Voluntas (2014) 25:772–796 793
123
contradiction to this, EDNs have as a rule very weak ties to the poor communities.
This is why the pull from the poor for accountability negotiation is missing.
Agyeman et al. (2009) as well as O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) support this
observation. They argue that dialogs with the poor result in better effectiveness of
aid delivery, hence allowing local knowledge to become the starting point of
resource allocation. We thus agree with O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010), Porter
(2003), and Kilby (2006) in their suggestion that better aid programs result from
listing to the beneficiaries needs. This leads to the last two hypothesis:
H3a The stronger EDNs are accountable to their beneficiaries (poor), the stronger
donors use local knowledge as the starting point of resource allocation.
H3b The stronger donors use local knowledge as the starting point of resource, the
more effective their aid delivery.
Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an empirical study aimed at furthering the understanding of
how different expectations toward the mission of poverty alleviation are negotiated
in an EDN and how this relates to the effectiveness of aid delivery. The results of
our research are limited. We only conducted an embedded case study with only
three cases. The hypotheses deduced from the empirical data have to be tested
according to their applicability to other EDNs. We compared companies active in
different cultural contexts and in different branches, which might lead to exclusion
of economic, cultural, and organizational factors that influence the results. Also,
with respect to the interest in downward accountability enhancing the effectiveness
of aid delivery, we can only deduct from our analysis that better tailored aid
programs could have been designed when listening to the beneficiaries. Similar to
the studies of O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) as well as Kilby (2006), we did not
observe aid programs being designed based on information gathered from
beneficiaries and clients. Further research thus needs to identify a case in which
an EDN designs aid programs based on the valuations of beneficiaries or in which
the donor demands inclusion of beneficiaries in the multiple accountabilities of the
nonprofit. This may give further insight as to how to avoid resource-based
accountability and strengthening impact-based accountability.
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